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The Concept of Tradition:  A Problem Out of 
MacIntyre 
 
 
 
Philip Devine 
Providence College 
 
 
 
“NATIONAL REVIEW . . . stands athwart history, yelling Stop.” 
—William F. Buckley1 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Tradition is one of those words whose sense, reference, and 
evaluative force depends on who uses it and why.  The concept of tradition is 
conspicuous in contemporary debates, both among those who reject traditional 
marriage or education as well as among those who affirm it.
2
  It is also central 
to Alasdair MacIntyre’s work both as an educator and a cultural critic, and an 
essential resource for the development of whatever answer his admirers may 
give to the question, “What is to be done?”  Many a revolution has been 
spurred by the desire to restore a tradition that the pursuit of external goods 
such as wealth has corrupted, but it remains to be seen whether MacIntyre’s 
philosophy supports this sort of revolution or any other form of political 
practice.  
 MacIntyre, like Karl Marx, is proposing a philosophy of practice; 
the context of his philosophical investigations is the difficulty experienced by 
followers of Leon Trotsky in finding grounds for condemning Stalinism, and 
more broadly finding a point of purchase for their moral judgments in 
history.
3
  There is more to MacIntyre than the concept of tradition, but his 
turning away from the politics of the nation-state to that of the local 
                                                          
1 William F. Buckley, “Our Mission Statement,” National Review, November 19, 
1955, accessed online at: http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/223549/our-mission-
statement/william-f-buckley-jr. 
 
2 On the rejection of historical marriage as a bad thing, see the references in David 
Blankenhorn, The Future of Marriage (New York: Encounter, 2007), pp. 161-63. 
 
3 For MacIntyre’s Trotskyist background, see Paul Blackledge and Neil Davidson, 
eds., Alasdair MacIntyre’s Engagement with Marxism (Chicago, IL: Haymarket, 
2009).  On the need for a philosophy of practice, see especially ibid., pp. 103, 422, and 
424. 
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community does not help matters here.  Such communities will have to make 
decisions concerning both their internal policies and their external relations, 
and in both cases the issue will arise concerning how much flexibility they can 
find in their governing traditions.  Hence, MacIntyre’s inability to answer 
questions of application would mean that his philosophy had failed.  How 
much guidance MacIntyre, or any philosopher, is required to supply is a 
complicated question; the demand that social and political philosophy should 
translate immediately into a political program is unreasonable, but detached 
contemplation of our social and political life is not an option either.  It would 
be a severe problem for MacIntyre’s view if he ended up returning us to 
politics as usual.
4
 
 
2. The Ambiguity of the Concept  
As one commentator has put it, MacIntyre holds the following view:  
 
We should steer a middle path between the conservatism of Edmund 
Burke, who exalts tradition over and against rationality, and the 
liberalism/radicalism of a Concordet and other Enlightenment 
figures, who exalt abstract rationality over and against tradition.
5
   
 
The question I am asking here is whether such a middle ground exists.
 6
   
Advocates of tradition argue that it is an inescapable part of our 
reasoning about both theoretical and practical matters.   Yet the concept of 
tradition on MacIntyre’s view suffers from an ambiguity, one that often 
appears in similar theorists, such as Cardinal John Henry Newman
7
 and, 
despite MacIntyre’s hostility to them both, David Hume8 and Edmund Burke.9     
                                                          
4 I address this question further in my “Politics after MacIntyre,” 2012, accessed online 
at: http://philipdevine.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/politics-after-macintyre-2/. 
 
5  Thomas D. D’Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 
p.  67. 
 
6 My colleague Michael O’Neill has suggested that Robin George Collingwood, Georg 
Hegel, Marx, and Yves Simon can fill the gaps in MacIntyre’s account of historical 
rationality.  This suggestion needs to be spelled out. 
 
7 On Newman, see Owen Chadwick, From Bossuet to Newman, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 
8 Julia Annas queries MacIntyre’s rejection of Hume as a traitor to the Scottish 
tradition in her “MacIntyre on Traditions,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 4 
(Autumn 1989), pp. 392ff., unfortunately relying too much on Hugh Trevor-Roper’s 
hostile account of pre-Humean Scottish culture.   
 
9  Even critics from the Left have faulted MacIntyre for undue hostility to Burke; see 
Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003), p. 320, n. 25.  For a briefer version of Stout’s critique of MacIntyre, see his 
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In Oedipus Rex Laius, fearing that his son will displace him, has him 
exposed to the elements.  Regardless of how powerful and ruthless fathers 
may be in suppressing their children, though, they always end up displaced.
10
  
The same is true of the status quo, however abstractly considered, for no set of 
rules, however detailed, can provide for all possible conflicts.  The open-
texture of our concepts means that our rules will always require interpretation, 
and the clashing interests and outlooks that exist in any society imply that we 
will always face divergent interpretations of our inherited ideas.  (An 
illuminating counter-example is the rules of chess; an illuminating counter-
example to the counter-example is the rules for conducting chess 
tournaments.)   
Some of these interpretations will be innovative or even radical.   
John Locke, while a key figure in the libertarian side of our tradition, can be 
interpreted as a social conservative,
11
 but arguments drawn from his writings 
can also undermine his traditional views,
12
  and thus make the prohibitions on 
suicide and infanticide that inform his political theory entirely arbitrary.
13
   In 
Newman, the true course of development of doctrine is discerned intuitively in 
a way that gives no guidance in cases of real doubt.   In any case, a tradition 
could not guide its adherents if it did not also constrain them; if it did not rule 
out some possibilities it would be useless.   
 
3. Understanding Tradition 
MacIntyre draws on the thought of Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos
14
 
to define tradition as an element of an ongoing practice of inquiry, which 
                                                                                                                              
“Homeward Bound,” Journal of Religion 69, no. 2 (April 1989), pp. 220-32, where the 
point about Burke is at p. 228, n. 9.  I am also indebted to an email exchange with 
Stout. 
 
10 I owe this point to Todd Gitlin; see his The Sixties (Toronto: Bantam, 1987).  
 
11 As Thomas West shows in his Witherspoon Lecture, “Vindicating John Locke: How 
a Seventeenth-Century ‘Liberal’ Was Really a Social Conservative” (Family Research 
Council, 2001), accessed online at: 
http://johnbalouziyeh.blogspot.com/2009/10/vindicating-john-locke.html. 
 
12 As Thomas Pangle shows in his Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
 
13 For a related discussion of the problems for Locke and the larger tradition, see Irfan 
Khawaja, “Review Essay: Edward Feser’s Locke and Eric Mack’s John Locke,” 
Reason Papers 32 (Fall 2010), pp. 155-71.   
 
14 Christopher Stephen Lutz, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2009), pp. 47-60, and Tom Angier, “MacIntyre’s 
Understanding of Tradition” (unpublished 2010) discuss the relative roles of Thomas 
Kuhn and Imre Lakatos in understanding MacIntyre.  The issue seems to be the extent 
to which the process of revising tradition can be governed by articulate standards. 
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might include large revisions of inherited theory and practice.  Another model 
for understanding a tradition is that of a craft; crafts, like traditions, can 
develop or degenerate. And similar issues arise:  Does Andy Warhol develop 
the visual arts, or does he represent their degeneration?  (Even Warhol’s 
admirers might draw the line at rural lawn sculpture.
15
) 
Yet another model for tradition is a natural language, and so the 
possibility that a person might become an adherent of, or at least understand, 
two different traditions is analogous to the possibility of his becoming 
bilingual. The canons of religious orthodoxy, the rules of law, and the kinship 
structures that designate some forms of sexual relation as incestuous, are all 
analogous to the rules of grammar.  We learn a tradition as we learn a 
language, that is, by authoritative teaching and by imitation of practice.  In 
both cases, the two sometimes diverge.  Ludwig Wittgenstein provides an 
enlightening picture of language, and hence also of the broader tradition 
carried along with it:  
 
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets 
and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions 
made from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of 
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.
16
   
 
Our city includes not only the stable elements Wittgenstein mentions, but also 
regions under construction, zones of conflict, and burnt-out districts not yet 
rebuilt.  It also includes regions in decline.  As Simon Blackburn puts it, “To 
paraphrase Wittgenstein, when we start to abandon a way of thought, the 
lights do not go out one by one, but darkness falls gradually over the whole.”17      
MacIntyre’s philosophy requires that we find a middle ground 
between ideas in Platonic heaven and entrenched social habits.  Traditions in 
the relevant sense involve claims to truth, but they also must inform the lives 
of their adherents.  They are historical-cultural facts as well as systems of 
belief, and they could do what they do for human beings were they otherwise.  
All of them have to be transmitted from generation to generation, and the 
process of doing so is emotionally fraught. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were 
ancient Greeks looking for a common human nature, with equal emphasis on 
both sides of this proposition.  Thus, those features of our existence that 
liberals dismiss as accidents of birth, such as birth on a certain territory or 
from certain sorts of parents, retain their relevance.    
                                                                                                                              
 
15 Such sculpture is too tacky to be found even on the World Wide Web; a typical 
example depicts a young boy urinating and showing the crack in his buttocks. 
 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New 
York: Macmillan, 1953), para. 18. 
 
17 Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 151. 
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In any event, we can distinguish two kinds of inquiry.  One consists 
in the attempt of adherents of a tradition to understand it more deeply and 
apply it to problem situations.  The other form of inquiry steps, at least to 
some extent, outside of the rival traditions and asks whether some tradition 
has exhausted itself and whether some other tradition can solve the resulting 
problems more adequately.     
At this point in the argument, we can exclude some forms of 
radicalism.   Some people claim that they can stand over and above the 
Western tradition and judge it as a whole to be a failure.  (Such a claim is 
itself characteristically Western; Marx was never guilty of radicalism in this 
sense.)  In MacIntyre’s sage words, however, 
 
[c]laims about hallucinations, illusion, distortion of thought, and the 
like can be made only from the standpoint of claims that the contrast 
can be clearly drawn between hallucinatory, illusory and distorted 
modes of perception or thought, on the one hand, and genuine 
perceptions of reality or rigorous or undistorted reflection and 
deliberation, on the other.  Hence, to identify ideological distortion 
one must not be a victim of it oneself.  The claim to a privileged 
exemption from such distortion seems to be presupposed when such 
distortion is identified in others.
18
 
 
Yet our problems arise not from outside agitators, but within the practice of 
our society, and lead to disputes among those usually considered conservative.   
What may be called the “integralist” impulse tries to rid a cultural 
tradition of extraneous elements, but at the risk of eliminating important 
truths.  On the other hand, the “cafeteria” approach to intellectual issues, 
which picks and chooses among inherent ideas according to need or even 
mood, gives one every opportunity for adapting one’s beliefs to one’s 
purposes, even in the most cynical way.   
 
4. MacIntyre’s Contribution 
As MacIntyre has observed, “traditions are defined retrospectively,” 
often because some challenge makes their adherents aware that all of them, 
whatever their differences, are contributing to the same enterprise.
19
  Tradition 
is then further defined by granting authoritative status to some documents of 
the past, as the New Testament accorded authority to what Christians call the 
Old Testament and St. Thomas called Aristotle “the Philosopher”; 
                                                          
18 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Ideology, Social Science, and Revolution,” Comparative 
Politics 5 (1975), p. 22. 
 
19 Alasdair MacIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2009), p. 165. 
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contemporary scientific naturalists adduce Galileo and Charles Darwin and 
literary modernists look back to James Joyce and T. S. Eliot.    
Tradition is a feature of a community that unites author and reader, 
but there is also a long-standing practice of “unorthodox” reading.  In 
consequence, the most important issues for a tradition arise from 
disagreements among adherents of the tradition itself, who are at least 
presumed to be able to apply its governing concepts competently.  When 
adherents of a tradition disagree, they look for core elements in the tradition 
immune to change in terms of which disputes on the periphery can be 
adjudicated.  However, different adherents often find the core in different 
places, in which case we have two or more traditions where we previously had 
one—in other words, a schism.  Two sorts of situation can be distinguished:  
A set of rules and principles fails to determine a result in some case, so that 
competent representatives of the same tradition reach different conclusions.  
And a tradition divides into two or more sub-traditions, which differ 
systematically in their conclusions.  These two situations are but different 
sides of the same phenomenon.
20
    
MacIntyre’s most important contribution to this debate has been to 
forge a link between rationality and tradition.  He points out that it is possible 
for a tradition to fail by its own standards, and thus encounter an incurable 
epistemological crisis.  Adherents of such a tradition might discover that some 
other tradition better solves its problems than the tradition itself can do.   
Hence, he has hopes of avoiding relativism.    
Reflective traditionalism admits the need for change while insisting 
on the demands of continuity—after all, Burke was a Whig, not a Tory.  Yet 
Burkean traditionalism threatens to become an empty rhetorical form, casting 
“decent drapery” or a “politic veil” over the results of power politics, 
whatever they might be.
21
  A revision of Buckley’s quotation at the opening of 
this article that is sometimes proposed—“The dominant strain of conservative 
thought has stood athwart history, yelling ‘Slow Down!’”22—keeps us on a 
slippery slope on which we might find ourselves, even that from Weimar to 
Adolf Hitler, albeit going down slowly.  Standard conservative and 
progressive accounts of tradition lack the resources to offer us a change of 
direction. 
Jeffrey Stout reads MacIntyre as demanding a highly structured 
tradition as the only alternative to conceptual and moral chaos:  
 
                                                          
20 I am here indebted to conversations with Josef Velazquez. 
 
21 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien 
(London: Penguin, 1986), pp. 103 and 171. 
 
22 Dale Carpenter, “A Conservative Defense of Romer v. Evans,” Indiana Law Journal 
76 (2001), p. 422. 
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Equally essential to the rationality of a practice, according to 
MacIntyre’s account, is its embodiment in institutions that are 
capable of securing agreement on a doctrine of the human good 
(presumably by means of catechism directed at newcomers and a 
combination of magisterial suasion, discipline, and excommunication 
directed at dissidents).
23
  
 
Citing Susan Moller Okin’s “incisive” critique of MacIntyre, Stout observes 
that feminism, though not a tradition in the sense of being defined by 
authoritative texts, is a tradition in the sense of being “‘a not yet completed 
narrative,’ an argument about the goods that constitute the tradition.”24    
This argument, however, confuses traditions in general with the 
particular tradition MacIntyre has embraced or even with a relatively stringent 
version of that tradition.  And it is false that feminism lacks an authoritative 
core.  Just try defending a pro-life position on the abortion issue around 
contemporary “mainstream” feminists, and you will discover that the concept 
of heresy is alive and well.
25
 This is not to say that the present situation among 
feminists is necessarily permanent;  there are pro-life feminists
26
 and they 
might prevail in subsequent discussions within the tradition.  As Stout 
observes, “All discursive practices involve authority and deference to some 
extent. . . . The difference is a matter of how, when, and why someone defers 
or appeals to authority, not a matter of whether one does so at all.”27 Heresy, 
let us recall, is not just any error, but an error by a purported adherent of a 
tradition that puts him or her outside its boundaries. Even the most loosely 
structured traditions can make it clear that someone has committed heresy.    
All traditions have their canons of orthodoxy and their internal debates, 
including debates between hard-liners and soft-liners.  Yet traditions behave 
                                                          
23 Stout, Democracy, p. 136.   
 
24 Ibid., p. 135, citing Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), p. 61. 
 
25 Patrice DiQuinzio, “Feminist Theory Reconfigured,” Reason Papers 18 (Fall 1993), 
pp. 17-29, praises the “instability” of feminist theory, but does not meet the point made 
in the text.  
 
26 See, for example, Juli Loesch Wiley, “Why Feminists and Prolifers Need Each 
Other,” New Oxford Review 60 (November 1993), pp. 9-14; Celia Wolf-Devine, 
“Abortion and the ‘Feminine Voice,’” Public Affairs Quarterly 3, no. 3 (July 1989), 
pp. 81-97; and Mary Crane Derr, Rachel MacNair, and Linda Naranjo-Huebl, Pro-Life 
Feminism:  Yesterday and Today, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 
2006).  The tradition is now represented by Feminists for Life of America, accessed 
online at: http://www.feministsforlife.org/. Feminists for Life publishes the American 
Feminist. 
 
27 Stout, Democracy, p. 212. 
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more like drops of mercury than like organisms, merging and splitting almost 
at will.    
Appeal to tradition is frequently appeal to the confluence of more 
than one tradition.
 
  In one of the stronger appeals to tradition in contemporary 
political argument, same-sex marriage opponents find it incredible that people 
at so many different times and places, whose beliefs and ways of life are in so 
many respects so different, could all have been wrong in their understanding 
of a crucial human institution.  Greco-Roman pederasts did not marry their 
boyfriends.  That the emperor Nero is reported to have “married” Sporus 
(whom he had  had castrated) as a man and Doryphorus as a woman shows 
nothing about what was considered healthy or normal even in imperial Rome.   
The moral of the story is that, as emperor, Nero could do—or thought he 
could do—whatever he wished.28    
Some traditionalists appeal to a sacred tradition going back to the 
origins of humanity and existing, often in distorted form, in all cultures.
29
    
But even this formulation gives us great liberty in distinguishing “sacred” 
tradition from its subsequent corruptions.   There are aspects of “traditional 
marriage” that no one would now defend, such as use of daughters, and to a 
lesser extent of sons, as pawns in intra-familial politics. This practice persists 
in some communities, but is increasingly marginal even there. 
Historically observable traditions change, or at least develop, often 
through an attempt to return to their origins.   When we move from a more 
rigorous to a less rigorous rendering of the same tradition—say, from pre-
Vatican II to post-Vatican II Roman Catholicism—there is both gain and loss.  
The advantages of a greater flexibility in dealing with the problems of human 
existence have been much celebrated, but the costs are increased confusion 
and, for any tradition faced with an aggressive cosmopolitan culture hostile to 
its understandings, the loss of the ability to resist externally generated 
pressure.
30
     
 
5. Development versus Degeneration 
Some understandings of tradition, however, do not allow for the 
possibility of development.
31
  If we refuse the immobilist option, that is to say, 
                                                          
28 See Suetonius, Lives of the Twelve Caesars, Nero, chaps. 28-29, accessed online 
at: 
http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Seutonius/12Caesers/Nero*ht
ml. 
 
29 See Josef Pieper, Tradition: Concept and Claim, trans. E. Christian Kopff 
(Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2008), esp. chaps. 4 and 5. 
 
30  For an argument that raises this worry, see John T. Noonan, Jr., A Church That Can 
and Cannot Change (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005). 
 
31 For a contemporary example, see Pieper, Tradition, esp. chap. 2, p. 47. 
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that of resisting any change whatever, we face the urgent but difficult issue of 
distinguishing development from decadence.  We cannot appeal to the verdict 
of history to resolve the question; as Jerome B. Schneewind puts it in a 
slightly different context, “If we must wait for it in order to know the solution 
to a problem, then that knowledge will have no role in the actual give and take 
of life.”32   
The American Revolution and the New Deal have been defended on 
traditionalist grounds.  Even the French Revolution carried out the Bourbon 
tradition of the centralized absolute state:  those of the revolutionaries’ 
decisions that Burke and his followers find most horrifying—the trial and 
execution of the king and the nationalization of the Church—followed English 
precedents.   If before the modern period, the trial, as opposed to the murder, 
of a king was an unthinkable proceeding, credit or blame for the change must 
rest squarely on the shoulders of Oliver Cromwell.
33
  Likewise, it was Henry 
VIII, not the Jacobins, who took the lead in placing the goods of the state in 
the possession of the nation (though, in practice, it was Henry VIII and his 
cronies who did this). Burke would have had no more sympathy with the 
radical Protestantism of the Puritans and their forebears than with the 
Enlightenment Deism of the French Revolutionaries.  
There is a gap in MacIntyre’s account between the concept of a 
practice and the concept of a tradition. This gap is most evident in his Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,
34
 in which he moves from tradition as 
inherited practice to three broad intellectual traditions, in which not all “plain 
persons” participate or are even aware of being part of a tradition.   Granted, 
we must be initiated into a practice before we reflect upon it.   We still, 
however, have to show how practices combine to form a tradition—whether a 
cultural tradition like that of the Sioux or a civilization-wide tradition like that 
of the Enlightenment—capable of regulating practice.  Such traditions have to 
go back either to creative figures immune to the normal dependence of human 
beings on their cultural past or else to some deity.   
What is needed to fill this gap is a philosophical ecclesiology—a 
philosophical understanding of the sort of historically embodied community 
that sustains a particular tradition.
35
  While attending to the historical data, the 
philosophical ecclesiologist will attempt to abstract conceptual and normative 
                                                          
32 Jerome B. Schneewind, “MacIntyre on the Indispensability of Traditions,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51, no. 1 (March 1991), p. 168.   
 
33 Despite Michael Walzer, Regicide and Revolution (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1992). 
 
34 Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 
 
35 I am indebted to the editors of Reason Papers for probing this issue. 
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principles from this data, examining such concepts as schism, fidelity, 
fundamentalism, and the distinction between development and decadence.
36
       
 
6. The American Legal and Political Tradition 
Traditions are historical entities that have founders, and which 
sometimes come to an end.  I solve the problem of individuating traditions by 
citing traditions that are articulately defended as such in the contemporary 
world.  Here I consider among self-identified traditions those with which I to 
some degree identify.  As examples of the sorts of considerations that are 
relevant, I make some judgments on controversial matters, which I could not 
fully justify without going too far afield.  Readers who disagree with my 
judgments will have to make similar judgments of their own.   Further inquiry 
would require the study of the survival and break-up of a variety of other 
traditions, both religious and secular.
37
    
I now offer a brief survey of the American legal and political 
tradition, whose outcome will support MacIntyre’s claim that we live among 
ruins.   In the early 1980s, MacIntyre identified himself with the American 
political tradition that combines procedural justice with republican virtue.
38
  
By 1987, however, his question had become “How to Be a North American,” 
and Canadians and Mexicans, despite their very different political histories, 
were included in the community supporting the American tradition, along 
with the Founding Fathers, Southern rebels, African-Americans, Native 
Americans, and Japanese and other immigrants.
39
  Though the social 
embodiment of a tradition need not be a nation-state, I do not see why North 
                                                          
36 For a historian of religion who foregrounds the conceptual issues, see Bruce B. 
Lawrence, Defenders of God (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
1995).  Decadence, as I understand it, is a cultural phenomenon, that of a community 
that has lost the capacity to transmit itself, biologically and culturally. 
 
37 In addition to the examples considered here, see Walter Shurden, ed., The Struggle 
for the Soul of the S[outhern] B[aptist] C[onvention] (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1993); Bradley J. Longfield, The Presbyterian Controversy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Leszek Kolakowksi, Main Currents of Marxism, trans. P. S. 
Falla (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). On the Anglican Communion, see Stephen 
Bates, A Church at War (London: Tauris, 2004); R. R. Reno, In the Ruins of the 
Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2002), esp. Pt. II; and Ephraim Radner and Philip 
Turner, The Fate of Communion (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006).    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
38 See Alasdair MacIntyre, “The Idea of America,” London Review of Books 2, no. 21 
(November 6-19, 1980), p. 14; Alasdair MacIntyre, “Public Virtue,” London Review of 
Books 4, no. 3 (February 18-March 3, 1982), p. 14.  For these and the following 
reference I am indebted to Kelvin Knight. 
 
39 Alasdair MacIntyre, How to Be a North American (Washington, DC: Federation of 
State Humanities Councils, 1988). 
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America, as opposed to say Euro-America or the Western hemisphere, is a 
useful way of specifying the social embodiment of a tradition.    
In any event, I here focus on the American political tradition and its 
important legal aspect, which is inevitably linked to the history of a particular 
nation-state. There are three major components of our political tradition:  
reliance on the U.S. Constitution as a legal document; the English-speaking 
liberal tradition founded by John Milton and Locke; and the “Judeo-Christian 
tradition,”40 on which we rely, as we once relied on “mainstream” 
Protestantism, when we emphasize the need for cultural continuity and public 
virtue.   
If we treat Anglo-American liberalism as a tradition of dealing with 
value conflict, in a complex relationship with the “civil religion” tradition of  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, we can avoid the severity of MacIntyre’s judgment of 
contemporary moral discourse and political practice, and hence also the 
question concerning how, on MacIntyre’s showing, he could possibly write 
his books.
41
  Recall here the “catastrophe theory” defended in his After 
Virtue
42: “This time however the barbarians are not beyond the gates; they 
have already been governing us for quite some time.”43 
Neither MacIntyre nor anyone else, however, has found a way of 
bridging the gap between the Evangelical and the Enlightenment wings of the 
American tradition or addressing effectively the related conflict between the 
demand for a virtuous citizenry and our reliance on institutional checks and 
abstract rights to manage the corrupt nature of humanity.  The libertarian side 
of our tradition limits the role of the state to maintaining public order, but 
relies on non-state communities to maintain the degree of virtue any 
functioning society requires. (In the case of a libertarian society, the most 
important social virtue is self-reliance.)  The question is how to ensure that, 
when the state shrinks, sufficiently robust non-state communities arise. 
Americans appeal to the law, and especially the Constitution, to 
resolve the ambiguities of our political tradition and make it possible for 
                                                          
40 The phrase “Judeo-Christian tradition,” though out of favor, still has its defenders; 
for example, Wilfred McClay, “The Judeo-Christian Tradition and the Liberal 
Tradition in the American Republic,” in Public Morality, Civic Virtue, and the 
Problem of Modern Liberalism, ed. T. William Boxx and Gary M. Quinlivan (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 124-37.  The most important polemic against this 
idea is Arthur A. Cohen, The Myth of the Judeo-Christian Tradition (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1970). 
 
41 For this criticism, see Stout, “Homeward Bound,” who uses MacIntyre’s criticism of 
Herbert Marcuse against MacIntyre himself. 
 
42 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981), chap. 1. 
 
43 Ibid., p. 245.  I am grateful to the editors of Reason Papers for probing this point. 
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adherents of divergent strands to live together.  Even the least traditional 
elements in American society appeal to the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which they sometimes seem to regard as the entire Constitution.  
No one thinks that the U.S. Supreme Court is infallible, however, even setting 
aside the notoriously fraught issue of abortion.  John Rawls, for whom the 
Court embodies “public reason,”44 finds some of its decisions “profoundly 
dismaying” 45 and would find some of its more recent decisions even more so.  
Apologies for Supreme Court decisions can be as divisive as criticisms of 
them.  Mark Graber defends the 1857 Dred Scott decision, hitherto reprobated 
by Democrats and Republicans alike.
46
   Yet if just any Supreme Court 
decision can be rejected, then constitutional jurisprudence is a game without 
rules.  However, if whatever the Court decides to do can be provided with 
decent jurisprudential drapery, we are faced with the collapse of constitutional 
jurisprudence into power politics.  
Nativist constitutional lawyers now argue that the provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment conferring citizenship on “all persons born . . . in the 
United States” does not extend to the children of undocumented aliens, whom 
such jurists think of as akin to an invading army.
47
  Authoritarian lawyers are 
prepared to argue that, as Richard Nixon once said, “When the President does 
it that means that it is not illegal.”48   A horrifying example of this doctrine is 
provided by John Yoo, who believes that the president has a higher-law right 
to torture children when he deems that national security so requires.
49
  
                                                          
44 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
Lect. VI, sec.  6. 
 
45 Ibid., p. 359.  Rawls’s examples are the campaign finance decisions Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and its sequel First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
(1978). 
 
46 Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); for a roster of critics of Dred Scott from every 
jurisprudential persuasion, see ibid., pp. 14-16.   
 
47 See John Eastman, “From Feudalism to Consent:  Rethinking Birthright 
Citizenship,” Heritage Foundation Legal Memorandum, March 30, 2006, accessed 
online at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/03/from-feudalism-to-
consent-rethinking-birthright-citizenship; and Lino A. Graglia, “Birthright Citizenship 
for the Children of Illegal Aliens:  An Irrational Public Policy,” Texas Review of Law 
and Politics 14, no. 1 (Fall 2009), pp. 1-14.  James C. Ho, “Defining ‘American,’” The 
Green Bag, 2nd ser. 9, no. 4 (Summer 2006), pp. 367ff., defends the received view.   
48 “Interview with David Frost” (May 19, 1977), printed in The New York Times, May 
20, 1977, p. A16.    
49 In a debate with Doug Cassell, Chicago, 2006; see “John Yoo Says President Bush 
Can Legally Torture Children,” accessed online at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hz01hN9l-BM.  The exchange went as follows: 
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A legal realist approach to such issues collapses not only the 
distinction between law and politics, but also that between politics and war.  
The only question then becomes: “Who gets to decide?”  Moreover, issues 
like abortion, immigration, and war, as well as the use of judicial power to 
stigmatize certain moral and political positions as unconstitutional, all have to 
do with our relationship with outsiders, both within and without the 
boundaries of America.  They engage the distinction between friends and 
enemies, and the sovereign power to draw the line between them.
50
  Thus Carl 
Schmitt defends the Night of the Long Knives from a legal point of view
51
:  
“the act of the Leader was a genuine act of jurisdiction [Gerichtsbarkeit].”52   
  It was the need to control payback violence that led to demands for 
the rule of law in the first place.   We now observe the transformation of law 
into politics, of politics into war (the result of which is sometimes called 
“lawfare”), followed by the transformation of war into payback violence in the 
style of Rambo.  This collapse of law into might has its correlates among elite 
scholars.  Legal scholars across the jurisprudential spectrum now join the 
Critical Legal Studies movement
53
 in holding that American law is an 
incoherent system, from which any position you please can be persuasively 
                                                                                                                              
“Cassel: If the president deems that he’s got to torture somebody, including by 
crushing the testicles of the person’s child, there is no law that can stop him?  Yoo: No 
treaty.   Cassel: Also no law by Congress—that is what you wrote in the August 2002 
memo.  Yoo: I think it depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that.” 
 
50 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab  (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters 
on the Theory of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005).  For an account of Schmitt’s intellectual and political 
development, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy (London: Verso, 2000); for an 
account of the constitutional crises and controversies that shaped his work, see Peter 
Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1997).  I am indebted to the revival of interest in Schmitt 
led by the journal Telos; see Ellen Kennedy et al., “Special Section: Carl Schmitt and 
the Frankfurt School,” Telos 71 (Spring 1987), pp. 37-109; and Paul Picone et al., 
Special Issue: Carl Schmitt: Enemy or Foe? Telos 72 (Summer 1987).  The discussion 
continues in Telos 73 (Fall 1987) and 74 (Winter 1987-1988). 
 
51 For a good brief description of the Night of the Long Knives, see Richard J. Evans, 
The Third Reich in Power (New York: Penguin, 2005), pp. 31-41. 
 
52 Carl Schmitt, “Der Fűhrer schűtzt das Recht [The Leader Protects the Right],” 
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 15 (August 1934), pp. 945-50, accessed online at: 
http://delete129a.blogsport.de/2007/09/aamasone-uebergesetzlishe-staatsnotwehr-a-
eine-deutsche-tradition/.   
 
53 See Roberto Magnabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); and Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of 
Adjudication (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).   
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supported.
54
  Episodes such as the O. J. Simpson trial confirm the popular 
impression that American law is a farce, for many Americans rightly believed, 
before the verdict, both that Simpson was guilty and that he would get off.
55
   
The mutual tolerance that underlies the American constitutional order 
is not a transcendent requirement standing above all of our other beliefs. The 
reasons for holding that tolerance does not stand outside the other goods of 
social life are also reasons for holding that militancy is not a transcendent 
requirement either.
56
  Hence, the survival of our traditions of political civility 
is an open question. 
 
7. Religious Traditions and the Development of Doctrine     
A tradition can die, as MacIntyre rightly insists, because it 
degenerates into inarticulate prejudices or because—as has happened with 
some forms of Islamic and Thomist thought—it ceases to support further 
inquiry.
57
  In Islamic thought, the issue turns on the continued possibility of 
ijtihad, or individual interpretation.
58
  When this happens, it becomes a 
treasured museum piece, which its supposed adherents ignore when it stands 
in the way of their important purposes.  A tradition can also die because it 
loses its ability to harmonize the results reached by its adherents.  Inquiry can 
mean anything from filling in tiny gaps to throwing the whole project into 
question (as MacIntyre does for some traditions). 
Some traditions limit themselves to accumulated human wisdom, 
others claim divine revelation, and others, like Thomism, invoke a mixture of 
the two.  Likewise, traditions sometimes speak about human nature and 
flourishing (and the requirements of justice among human beings), sometimes 
                                                          
54 See Paul F. Campos, Jurismania (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Pierre 
Schlag, Laying Down the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Steven 
D. Smith, Law’s Quandary (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Paul F. 
Campos, Pierre Schlag, and Steven D. Smith, Against the Law (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1996).  Louis Michael Seidman and Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants of 
Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), reach the same result from other 
political and jurisprudential premises.   
 
55 I owe this point to Robert Huguenor. 
 
56 This sentence is directed against Stanley Fish, e.g., There’s No Such Thing as Free 
Speech, and It’s a Good Thing, Too (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), and 
Stanley Fish, “Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds between Church and 
State,” Columbia Law Review 97, no. 8 (December 1997), pp. 2255-2333.   
 
57 I owe this point to O’Neill.   
 
58 For detailed discussion, see Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic 
Law (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Joseph Schacht, 
Origins of Muhammedan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950). 
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about divine revelation, and sometimes about both.  The problems I have 
found for the concept of tradition arise for both its human and its divine 
aspects.   I therefore now turn to religious traditions.  
The two-sided character of the concept of religious tradition, as 
MacIntyre explains it, reflects the concept of God: “theistic belief has a 
double aspect, at once problematic and unproblematic.  As the former, it 
invites ruthless and systematic questioning.  As the latter it requires devoted 
and unquestioning obedience.”59  Doctrines such as the Trinity are “to be 
piously believed and not impiously questioned,” as St. Columban puts it.60  
Against those people who claim a patent or copyright on God, we must 
maintain that He is greater than any conceptual and normative structure we 
may be able to formulate.  Yet God also addresses us—or at least is believed 
to address us—with quite definite requirements of belief and practice.   We 
see this tension at work in the endless dialogue between creative, and 
therefore dissident, Catholic theologians and the Church’s doctrinal 
watchdogs (and consequently the “police court” theology assessing the 
authority of various documents and the resulting limits on dissent).    Catholic 
authority is now searching for a “hermeneutics of continuity,” which avoids 
both repudiation of Vatican II as heretical and the claim that the “spirit of 
Vatican II” authorizes limitless departures from past belief and practice,61 but 
it is not evident how this can be done. 
We are not Platonic philosopher-kings (or -queens) creating 
institutions de novo.  Hence, the advice a philosopher can give theologians 
and community leaders is limited. We need not only to reflect on our 
traditions, but also to live them, and this means that interaction with human 
experience in its many forms cannot be avoided.    There is no algorithm to 
distinguish legitimate developments of a tradition from degenerations of it, 
but considerations drawn from the need of the adherents of a tradition to 
maintain and transmit it to future generations can at least provide persuasive 
arguments.  The vitality of any tradition requires respectful attention to the 
convictions of one’s fellow adherents, both living and dead.   
   Martin Luther’s “humanist” opponents, such as Erasmus and 
Thomas More, were right to foresee that his theology entailed 
fragmentation—since his day, the extreme fragmentation—of Christendom.  
(Although Protestants do not view schism as gravely as do Catholics, even 
many Protestants find the present chaos disquieting.)  There is something 
profoundly wrong, even apart from the issues of substance, about the way that 
                                                          
59 Lutz, Tradition, p. 8. 
 
60 Sermons of Columbanus, Sermon I (Cork, Ireland: University College, 2004), 
accessed online at: www.ucc.ie/celt/published. 
 
61 See Benedict XIV, “Christmas Message to the Roman Curia,” December 22, 2005, 
Adoremus Bulletin 13, no. 8 (November 2007), accessed online at: 
http://www/adoremu,org/1107BXVI_122205.html. 
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liberals in the Anglican Communion pursued the issues of the ordination of 
women and open homosexuals.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
At this point, it is necessary to warn against the fundamentalist 
solution to the problem of fragmentation in tradition, namely, to find one 
authoritative source (the Pope, the Bible, or something else) and cleave to it 
through thick and thin.  The identity, scope, interpretation, and methods of 
application of any authority all depend on the tradition in which the authority 
finds its place.  This does not mean, as Liberal Protestants are accused of 
saying, that the Church wrote the Bible and can rewrite it.
62
  Neither the 
authorities themselves, nor the way they are customarily received, supports 
such a reading.    
It will not do to take the Zeitgeist as our authority, since 
contemporary people disagree about all of the pertinent issues and many 
phenomena are both characteristically modern and horrible.  If we were 
Germans living in 1930, “getting with it” would be the last thing any sane 
person would do. There is also the mishmash or worse that results when an 
individual favors whatever bits of tradition happen to favor his mood, 
inclinations, or political program and he puts the bits together; such 
phenomena can range from secular bar mitzvahs to Visigothic blessings of 
same-sex unions conducted by Anglican bishops.  One wonders whether even 
the authors of such concoctions take the results seriously; the rest of us are 
under no obligation to do so.  Even here the criterion is pragmatic and 
aesthetic. Some people end up taking very gravely what others regard as 
campy jokes or examples of guerilla theater. (I here deal with postmodern 
developments within pre-existing traditions, not with postmodernism or 
genealogy as traditions in their own right.
63
) 
One would like some way of knowing in advance the practical 
consequences of proposed innovations, but we inevitably judge by results in 
fact (in the Anglican case, high-profile secessions among  its  more  traditional  
adherents and a loss of over one third of its membership).
64
  For the rest, we 
need to return to the rough ground of moral, political, and religious argument.  
                                                          
62 I do not know of anyone who holds this view explicitly, though there are plenty of 
people who act as if they did. 
 
63 On which, see MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.  
 
64 I calculate the decline of membership from 1968, when the House of Bishops 
declined to take action against Bishop Pike for his unorthodox theological views.  For 
details on membership, see “Episcopal Church Reports Lowest Membership in 70 
Years,”  2001, accessed online at: 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/episcopal-church-reports-lowest-
membership-in-70-years/; David Virtue, 2011, accessed online at:  
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Traditionalists need to defend their stances not only as venerable, but also as 
true or valuable in a way that can be recognized today. That long-standing 
elements of our traditions should not easily be set aside is an important 
consideration, but no more than that. Traditionalists about marriage, for 
example, cannot rely on the antiquity of heterosexual marriage alone, but will 
have to appeal also to our need for an institution making regular provision for 
the procreation and the rearing of the next generation, and to the danger that 
admitting rival forms of “marriage” will undermine this institution by inviting 
heterosexuals to regard their marriages as no more binding than gay 
relationships.
65
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65 This essay was read to a meeting of the International Society for MacIntyrean 
Enquiry at Providence College in July 2011.  I am indebted to the participants at that 
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